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THE COHERENCE OF COMPENSATION-DETERRENCE
THEORY IN TORT LAW
Mark A. Geistfeld*
INTRODUCTION
The most influential torts scholars in the Twentieth Century form
a diverse group whose thoughts may be placed under the banner of
compensation-deterrence theory. Holmes was the theory's grandfa-
ther. It was developed in earnest by mid-century proponents such
as Leon Green and William Prosser. Some of its most prominent
later-century adherents have included Kenneth Abraham, Michael
Green, James Henderson, William Powers, Robert Rabin, Gary
Schwartz, Aaron Twerski, and John Wade. These scholars have
largely defined the universe of torts for thousands of lawyers and
judges through their books, treatises, and articles. This same group
has taken the lead role in drafting the American Law Institute's in-
fluential "Restatements" of tort law, as well as the 1991 "Reporters'
Study" of the American tort system. Moreover, a great deal-per-
haps the majority-of twentieth-century torts scholarship has con-
sisted of "normal science" undertaken within the paradigm of
compensation-deterrence theory.'
Based on these sweeping generalizations by John Goldberg, one
could easily wonder why the coherence of "compensation-deterrence
theory" is worth addressing for a symposium honoring one of the pur-
ported adherents of this approach. The issue requires extensive analy-
sis for reasons raised by Goldberg's excellent history of tort
scholarship in the twentieth century, the first article to identify "com-
pensation-deterrence theory" as a leading interpretation of tort law.2
Despite Goldberg's observations about the widespread acceptance of
"compensation-deterrence theory," it at this point deserves scare
* Sheila Lubetsky Birnbaum Professor of Civil Litigation, New York University School of
Law. Special thanks to Bob Rabin and other participants at the 17th Annual Clifford Sympo-
sium on Tort Law and Social Policy for their helpful comments. As I hope is made clear by this
Article, my understanding of tort law owes a great deal to the scholarship of Professor Rabin.
1. John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521 (2003) (foot-
notes omitted).
2. Cf G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 146-47, 178
(1980) (describing the central debate as whether tort law is best understood as furthering the
objective of compensation or deterrence and concluding that the issue was resolved by the 1970s
in favor of a "consensus" conception of tort law as a "compensation system").
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quotes because Goldberg provides little reason for concluding that
this approach is a coherent theory of tort law.
Having recognized that his depiction of compensation-deterrence
theory is novel and therefore surprising in light of his claim that the
approach has been deeply influential, Goldberg attributes his counter-
intuitive finding to the antitheoretical nature of its inquiry:
To readers familiar with the academic literature of tort theory, the
attribution of such great success to compensation-deterrence theory
may seem odd, given that it is hardly ever mentioned there. This is
in part because its adherents often have disagreed among them-
selves on substantive issues. It is also because these scholars tend to
express skepticism about the utility of "theorizing" or "philoso-
phizing": modes of analysis they regard as antithetical to the sort of
functional, instrumental, pragmatic, or purposive analysis in which
scholars may usefully engage. Contained within these professions
of theory-skepticism is an implicit disclaimer: We are in the business
of sober, grounded analysis; we do not engage in idle theorizing. The
adoption of this posture seems to have been fantastically effective.
Indeed, compensation-deterrence theory enjoys a unique status as
the only mode of theorizing about tort that has been largely spared
the need to explain and justify itself.3
Goldberg ultimately concludes that "compensation-deterrence the-
ory is no more or less a theory of tort than the other theories," 4 but his
analysis belies that claim. Once required to explain and justify itself,
compensation-deterrence theory fails on Goldberg's account. On his
view, this so-called theory typically involves "efforts at soft policymak-
ing [that] have in turn engendered the impression that there is no con-
tent to tort law or scholarship, but merely an undisciplined, ad hoc
balancing of policy factors."5 If this description is accurate, then
compensation-deterrence theory is merely an invitation for judges to
engage in the unprincipled exercise of political power, leading
Goldberg to conclude that "compensation-deterrence theory raises a
basic issue as to the legitimacy of the common law of torts."6 So con-
ceptualized, compensation-deterrence theory does not meet the mini-
mal requirements of a viable theory of tort law, at least as that
concept is commonly employed within legal scholarship today.
Because there is no consensus about the appropriate rationale for
tort liability, one must engage in an interpretive exercise in order to
identify the most plausible rationale for tort liability. The interpretive
exercise has been conceptualized in different ways by different schol-
3. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 521-22 (footnotes omitted).
4. Id. at 522.
5. Id. at 536.
6. Id.
384 [Vol. 61:383
2012] COMPENSATION-DETERRENCE THEORY
ars, but there is widespread agreement about the minimal require-
ments of a plausible interpretive theory. "It is a commonplace among
most jurists that theoretical accounts of any area of the law, including
tort, must fit some of the law's principal structural and doctrinal fea-
tures. It is also often assumed that such accounts must, where possi-
ble, make those features both intelligible and normatively
respectable."7
The compensation-deterrence theory described by Goldberg proba-
bly fails the test of "fit" and undoubtedly flunks the test of normative
respectability. He concludes that any effort to interpret the default
rule of negligence liability in terms of compensation and deterrence
"is reductionist, highly manipulable, and therefore of doubtful explan-
atory value," leading Goldberg to conclude that the theory "arguably
... fails to capture the contours and texture of tort doctrine."8 Mat-
ters are even worse with respect to the test of normative respectabil-
ity. According to Goldberg, compensation-deterrence theory relies
on an "abstract idea of 'policy' [that] can just as readily support deci-
sions to limit or not limit particular forms of negligence liability."9 An
inherently manipulable approach to tort law that can justify liability in
only an ad hoc manner is worthy of little or no normative respect,
effectively disqualifying the approach as a viable interpretation of tort
law.
The disdain for compensation-deterrence reasoning is shared by
other tort scholars. For example, Ernest Weinrib claims that the ap-
proach is fundamentally incoherent for quite evident reasons. The
need for compensation depends only on the occurrence of injury, re-
gardless of its source: "nothing about compensation as such justifies its
limitation to those who are the victims of deterrable harms . . ..
Similarly, the need for deterrence exists whenever someone has en-
gaged in undesirable behavior: "nothing about deterrence as such jus-
tifies its limitation to acts that produce compensable injury."" Any
injury is an appropriate candidate for compensation, whereas any
form of undesirable risky behavior is an appropriate candidate for de-
terrence. The functions of compensation and deterrence are not mu-
7. William Lucy, Method and Fit: Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of Tort Law,
52 McGILL L.J. 605, 648 (2007). For example, according to the highly influential theory of Ron-
ald Dworkin, the interpretation of law has two distinct dimensions-"fit" and "justification"-
each of which provides an independent basis for evaluating the plausibility of different interpre-
tations. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 65-68 (1986).
8. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 534.
9. Id.
10. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995).
11. Id.
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tually dependent and can be decoupled. Lacking internal coherence,
either function can be arbitrarily invoked to reach whatever result the
judge chooses in a particular case, making compensation-deterrence
theory the sort of ad hoc, unprincipled approach described by
Goldberg.
To be sure, Goldberg recognizes that "compensation-deterrence
theorists tend to be highly skilled lawyers whose competence resides
in parsing case law and rendering lawyerly judgments,"12 but without
an underlying principle, compensation-deterrence theory cannot be
rendered normatively respectable by the nature of common law rea-
soning. Like other forms of the common law, the legal inquiry in tort
law relies on analogical reasoning, "arguing from one case to the next
on the basis of perceived likenesses and differences and the location
of the instant case in the landscape of common experience painted by
the judge or lawyer in command of the full resources of the common
law."13 Because "[a]nalogical reasoning is reasoning by or from exam-
ple...... from like to like," it "presupposes some degree of (threshold)
relevant similarity."1 4 Without any underlying principle, there is no
way to identify the requisite degree of similarity required by the ana-
logical reasoning that judges employ to decide tort cases.
To illustrate, consider a case in which the plaintiff solely relies on
prior cases that apparently furthered the function of compensation
and not deterrence. Suppose the defendant responds by relying on
prior cases that apparently denied the plaintiff compensation because
liability would not further the function of deterrence. To decide
whether the case law supports the plaintiff's recovery, the judge must
determine which line of cases is sufficiently similar to the present dis-
pute and which line of cases can be distinguished. What are the rele-
vant distinctions? Answering that question requires a resort to
principle.
"The major challenge facing analogical reasoners is to decide when
differences are relevant. To make this decision, they must investigate
cases with care in order to develop governing principles. The judg-
ment that a distinction is not genuinely principled requires a substan-
tive argument of some kind."' 5 Consequently, "no clear line of
distinction can be drawn between argument from legal principle and
12. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 536.
13. Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JU-
RISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAw 588, 594 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) (discussing "[tihe problem-solving typical of the common law judge").
14. Id. at 604.
15. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741, 745
(1993).
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argument from analogy. Analogies only make sense if there are rea-
sons of principle underlying them." 16
Rather than obviate the need for courts to rely on principle, the
nature of common law reasoning critically depends on principle or the
substantive reasons that explain why liability rules function in a partic-
ular manner. Thus, if the functions of compensation and deterrence
are not coherently unified by an underlying principle of tort liability,
then the nature of common law reasoning will not prevent
compensation-deterrence theory from being arbitrary and unprinci-
pled in application.
In light of this obvious problem, the puzzle is to explain how
compensation-deterrence theory could have exerted so much influ-
ence over the development of tort law during the twentieth century.
To initially address this question, Part II provides a more complete
description of compensation-deterrence theory.' 7 The sca:e quotes
initially placed around compensation-deterrence theory are unneces-
sary for reasons given in Part III, which shows how the functions of
compensation and deterrence can provide a coherent, normatively ap-
pealing theory of tort law.18 Part IV then relates this version of com-
pensation-deterrence theory to broader developments within tort law
over the course of the twentieth century.19 Part V concludes by ex-
plaining why this conception of tort law is still coherent even though it
can justify the elimination of the tort system in favor of alternative
institutional arrangements. 20
The analysis does not show that this particular formulation of
compensation-deterrence theory is the one adopted by any of the
scholars Goldberg lists as following this approach.21 The analysis in-
stead attempts to make the basic point that such a widely held view
about the nature of tort law is likely to be far more cogent than critics
have recognized. Good reasons might counsel in favor of alternative
rationales for tort liability, but compensation-deterrence theory can-
not be rejected on the ground that it necessarily lacks the descriptive
capabilities and normative respectability required for courts to engage
in principled lawmaking.
16. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 186 (1978).
17. See infra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 45-89 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
21. For a listing of these proponents, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF COMPENSATION-DETERRENCE THEORY
The logic of compensation-deterrence theory has been skillfully de-
veloped by John Goldberg, who also provides the only express ac-
count of that theory in the literature. 22 Goldberg's account, however,
must be read in conjunction with the towering intellectual history
of tort law provided by G. Edward White.23 Ultimately, the
compensation-deterrence theory in Goldberg's account corresponds
to the "consensus thought" that White ascribes to tort scholarship for
the period from 1945 to 1970.24 When read together, these two ac-
counts clearly reveal the structural components of, and puzzles posed
by, compensation-deterrence theory.
A. Compensation-Deterrence Theory
As Goldberg correctly observed, compensation-deterrence theory
does not disavow the historical antecedents of modern tort liability,
but instead is based on the manner in which the nature of tort liability
had fundamentally changed by the twentieth century.
Compensation-deterrence theory accepts as its premise that tort
suits probably once .... [were] characterized by the adjudication of
private disputes by judges and juries who, through the formalities of
the legal system, employed ordinary moral principles to determine
whether a given defendant had violated the plaintiff's rights and
therefore became obligated, as a matter of justice, to provide re-
dress in compensation for the violation.
In the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, however,
the character of the typical tort suit changed fundamentally. . . . In
substance it was a new creature entirely. 25
The substance of tort law changed because courts could no longer
invoke conventional morality to resolve tort disputes.
With modernity came increasing doubt as to the possibility of con-
sensus on moral norms or tenets. Moreover, ... the conduct about
which modern plaintiffs tended to complain no longer consisted of
everyday bad acts, such as D intentionally striking P or stealing
from P. Rather, it consisted of the failure of commercial enterprises
to account adequately for the safety of employees, customers, and
bystanders. There were no immediately applicable customary
22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
23. See WHITE, supra note 2.
24. Compare Goldberg, supra note 1, at 536-37 (suggesting that the logic of compensation-
deterrence theory entails "the brave new world of antiformalist common law adjudication
imagined by Prosser, in which judges forthrightly engage in 'social engineering"'), with WHYTE,
supra note 2, at 139-79 (using the scholarship of William Prosser to illustrate the consensus in
tort scholarship during the period from 1945 to 1970).
25. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 522-23.
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norms for this sort of conduct. It was therefore no accident that the
legal standard increasingly employed by modem judges to gauge be-
havior-the standard of reasonable care-was an objective one de-
signed to express what society demands of an actor, rather than to
measure the actor's moral culpability. As the economy and society
modernized, objective negligence came to dominate tort, and tort
increasingly took the form of rulings based on judges' conceptions
of the social desirability or undesirability of particular forms of
conduct. 26
Because judges could no longer base tort liability solely on wrongs
defined by violations of conventional morality, courts had to adopt an
abstract norm of liability embodied in the objective standard of rea-
sonable care. What is that norm?
Because they have the power to order defendants to pay damages,
courts can, in principle, deter the defendant and other similarly situ-
ated actors from engaging in conduct they deem undesirable; at
least insofar as the threat of damages awards affects actors' deci-
sions and the court can rely on future courts to permit or impose
sanctions on such actors. Likewise, courts can compensate at least
some injured persons. Thus, the judges and juries who have been
empowered by tort to legislate by the disposition of actions under
the common law are in a position to accomplish two, and only two,
things: deterrence and compensation. And so we arrive at the base-
line proposition of compensation-deterrence theory, repeated at the
outset of countless law review articles published in the last fifty
years: The function of tort law is to compensate and deter.27
So far this account is uncontroversial and brilliant in laying bare a
dynamic that had not been adequately appreciated. However, the na-
ture of the judicial conception of desirable forms of conduct-the pol-
icy decision implicated by a tort claim-is not well explained by
Goldberg. One must instead turn to White's intellectual history for
that explanation, which begins with the influence of Legal Realism on
tort law:
Instead of "good rules" rather than "bad rules," the mature Realists
wanted the mythical nature of all rules revealed. Law for them was
a set of governmental judgments about the claims of "interests": the
law that was "made" in a given case was a function of the "inter-
ests" at stake therein. The legal rules affecting water companies
were different from those affecting railroads or coal miners. It was
fruitless to generalize beyond the immediacy of the case and the
clash of interests that it posed.28
26. Id. at 523-24 (footnotes omitted).
27. Id. at 525 (footnote omitted).
28. WHITE, supra note 2, at 82.
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As interpreted by William Prosser, for example, "[t]ort law con-
sisted of exercises in 'social engineering': it was 'concerned primarily
with the adjustment of the conflicting interests of individuals to
achieve a desirable social result." 29 This approach was widely fol-
lowed. "In conceiving of tort law as a process in social engineering in
which competing interests were weighed Prosser was in the main-
stream of mid-twentieth-century legal thought."30
As the twentieth century progressed, tort scholars continued to con-
ceptualize tort law in the Realist terms of interest balancing, but most
ultimately rejected the Realist premise that tort scholarship could be
advanced by unmasking the mythical nature of all tort rules. "That
retreat implicitly signified the renaissance in American jurisprudence
of 'consensus' thought: a search for core values or basic principles
around which lawmakers might cohere."31
The ensuing search for consensus thought or a general principle
helps to explain why, on Goldberg's account, compensation-
deterrence theorists were drawn to "the pure 'fault principle,' a rule of
prima facie negligence liability unadorned by arbitrary limitations." 3 2
[T]here is an airtight fit between compensation-deterrence theory
and the pure fault principle: Precisely because the purpose of tort
law is to deter socially undesirable conduct and to compensate any
actual losses of welfare flowing from such conduct, and precisely
because conduct is socially undesirable when unreasonable, it fol-
lows that, prima facie, whenever an actor's unreasonable conduct
causes any harm, the actor should pay for that harm. This way, the
injured person is compensated by means of a payment that, because
it comes from the pocket of the antisocial actor, will deter such acts
in the future.33
The pure fault principle has obvious appeal to compensation-
deterrence theorists, but the search for consensus during the mid-
twentieth century did not end with negligence liability. According to
Goldberg, William Prosser was one of the leading twentieth-century
compensation-deterrence tort scholars.34 Like other mainstream tort
scholars of this era, Prosser analyzed tort law as a matter of interest
balancing. When compensation-deterrence theory is formulated in this
manner, it can readily justify rules of strict liability.
As White explains:
29. Id. at 157 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 15 (1941)).
30. Id. at 158.
31. Id. at 140.
32. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 527 (footnote omitted).
33. Id.
34. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 61:383390
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Relational negligence, while retaining the concept of fault, had
made the determination of where fault lay in a given case a process
of interest-balancing. Strict liability theory proposed to conduct the
interest-balancing altogether unburdened by notions of fault. In
1917 Jeremiah Smith had found those isolated instances of "strict"
liability in tort law exceptional in their repudiation of the general
fault standard. By 1941 Prosser was prepared to "question whether
'fault,' with its popular connotation of personal guilt and moral
blame, and its more or less arbitrary legal meaning, which [would]
vary with the requirements of social conduct imposed by the law,
[was] of any real assistance in dealing with . . . questions of [risk
allocation], except perhaps as a descriptive term." Once the legal
concept of fault was divorced from current standards of moral
wrongdoing, Prosser argued, "there [was] a sense in which liability
with or without 'fault' must beg its own conclusion."35
When interest balancing is "unburdened by notions of fault,"
compensation-deterrence theory can justify rules of strict liability.
Prosser, for example, famously championed the rule of strict products
liability.36 Once tort liability no longer depends on the defendant's
violation of conventional morality, forms of no-fault liability can be-
come acceptable.
Because it recognizes that tort liability does not depend on personal
fault or culpable wrongdoing by the defendant, compensation-
deterrence theory ultimately merges into the consensus thought that
White ascribes to tort scholarship during the period from 1945 to 1970.
The consensus involved the resolution of the debate following World
War II about "whether tort law best functioned primarily as an instru-
ment for admonishing currently undesirable civil conduct or whether
tort law ought primarily to be a means for compensating injured peo-
ple."37 Having rejected the admonishment function, compensation-
deterrence theory simply utilizes tort liability as a means for compen-
sating injured people, thereby explaining White's finding that the con-
sensus in tort scholarship that occurred during the mid-twentieth
century largely involved the emergence of such a compensatory ratio-
nale for tort liability.
An idea of Torts as a public law subject, concerned primarily with
the adjustment of risks among members of the public so as to
achieve fairer and more efficient means of compensating injured
persons, was replacing an idea of Torts as a private law subject, con-
35. WImTE, supra note 2, at 109 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting PROSSER,
supra note 29, at 431).
36. See generally William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (arguing that product sellers should be strictly liable for physi-
cal harms caused by defective products).
37. Id. at 146-47.
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cerned primarily with deterring and punishing blameworthy civil
conduct. 38
When tort compensation is not limited to the redress of blamewor-
thy civil conduct, the liability rule will necessarily serve two func-
tions-it identifies the conditions under which injury compensation is
desirable and accordingly creates financial incentives for dutyholders
to avoid injuring others by acting safely. These two functions can then
be merged into a unitary conception of tort liability-what Goldberg
calls compensation-deterrence theory.
B. The Puzzle of Compensation-Deterrence Theory
The conclusion that compensation-deterrence theory can justify
rules of strict liability would seem to bolster the most devastating cri-
tique that Goldberg levels against that approach: its inability to ex-
plain why the functions of compensation and deterrence justify a
default rule of negligence liability instead of strict liability.
On the prescriptive level, those compensation-deterrence theo-
rists who have embraced fault as a general standard of liability have
offered remarkably little by way of justification. Indeed, for all the
attention they have devoted to negligence, they have said very little
about why they regard it as striking the right mix of deterrence and
compensation.39
This challenge is considerable. As compared to negligence liability,
strict liability provides compensatory damages in more cases. As for
the objective of deterrence, strict liability gives actors an incentive to
exercise the same amount of care required by the Hand formulation
of negligence liability.40 However, the difficulty of proving negligence
liability can substantially reduce its deterrence capabilities, a problem
that courts have relied upon to justify rules of strict liability, including
the critically important rule of strict liability governing the commercial
distribution of defective products.41 Both compensation and deter-
38. WHITE, supra note 2, at 178.
39. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 535.
40. See generally Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980)
(showing that negligence and strict liability each provide incentives to exercise the amount of
care required by cost-benefit analysis or the Hand formula with respect to those risks that are
fully governed by each liability rule).
41. E.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) ("[Tlhis court's product liabil-
ity decisions ... have repeatedly emphasized that one of the principal purposes behind the strict
product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary
burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action."). By justifying strict products liability in this
manner, courts were relying on established doctrine. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF
TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE
COMMON LAw 393 (1st ed. 1887) ("[Tlhe ground on which a rule of strict obligation has been
maintained and consolidated by modem authorities is the magnitude of danger, coupled with the
[Vol. 61:383392
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rence would seem to favor a greater role for strict liability than cur-
rently recognized by the tort system, making it hard to see how
compensation-deterrence theory can plausibly explain why negligence
liability dominates the torts landscape.
The problem stems from the compensatory component of
compensation-deterrence theory. A pure deterrence-based theory
can rely on a general rule of negligence liability that is supplemented
by rules of strict liability for the exceptional cases in which negligence
is hard to prove. The objective of injury compensation, by contrast,
would seem to straightforwardly justify a default rule of strict liability,
which provides compensatory damage awards for a much wider range
of.accidental harms than negligence liability. By making the compen-
sation of injury an important function of tort liability, how can com-
pensation-deterrence theory plausibly explain the default rule of
negligence liability?
Any effort to square compensation-deterrence theory with tort doc-
trine must also explain why tort scholars in the twentieth century in-
creasingly viewed tort law as a form of public law. According to
Goldberg, compensation-deterrence theory maintains that, in evolving
from its premodern incarnation, tort law "had transformed itself from
private to 'public' law, whereby it functioned to achieve collective, not
corrective, justice." 42 Similarly, the "consensus thought" that White
ascribes to tort scholarship during the period from 1945 to 1970 partly
involved "replacing an idea of Torts as a private law subject" with
"[a]n idea of Torts as a public law subject." 43 By conceptualizing torts
in the collective terms of public law, were mainstream tort scholars
also adopting the radical position that courts ought to reject the tradi-
tional bilateral framework of tort law-one that bases liability on the
defendant's breach of a duty in violation of the plaintiff's tort right? If
so, then what explains Goldberg's conclusion that compensation-
deterrence theorists "have largely defined the universe of torts for
thousands of lawyers and judges," in no small part due to their "lead
role in drafting the American Law Institute's influential 'Restate-
ments' of tort law"?"4 Is it possible to square the idea that tort liabil-
ity can function as a form of public law with a mainstream,
conventional conception of tort liability that operates within the tradi-
tional bilateral framework of tort law?
difficulty of proving negligence as the specific cause, in the particular event of the danger having
ripened into actual harm.").
42. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 524.
43. WHiTE, supra note 2, at 178.
44. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 521 (footnotes omitted).
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The foregoing formulation of compensation-deterrence theory,
therefore, leaves unanswered fundamental questions. Negligence or
strict liability? Private law or public law? As these questions reveal,
compensation-deterrence theory requires further development to be
deemed a viable interpretive theory of tort law.
III. A PRINCIPLED FOUNDATION FOR COMPENSATION-
DETERRENCE THEORY
Compensation-deterrence theory recognizes that tort law was origi-
nally a form of private law that redressed a violation of the plaintiff's
right by the defendant-dutyholder, but it also recognizes that as social
conditions changed, the substantive content of the tort right could no
longer be defined by conventional morality or customary norms of
behavior.45 Compensation-deterrence theory, therefore, is based on
the premise that modern tort law must rely on an abstract norm to
determine the substantive content of the liability rules. Identifying
the content of that norm is critical for the formulation of compensa-
tion-deterrence theory, as is true for any other interpretive theory of
tort law not based on conventional morality or customary social
practices.
For historical reasons, the abstract tort norm is quite plausibly one
of compensation-the concern that first distinguished tort law from
criminal law in the medieval writ system:
Lawyers and judges in English royal courts between 1200 and
1500 drew a distinction between crime and tort....
The distinction between crime and tort was not a difference be-
tween two kinds of wrongful acts. In most instances, the same
wrong could be prosecuted either as a crime or as a tort. Nor was
the distinction a difference between the kinds of persons who could
initiate the actions. Victims could initiate actions of both kinds.
According to the lawyers, victims who preferred vengeance over
compensation prosecuted their wrongdoers for crime. Victims who
preferred compensation over vengeance sued their wrongdoers for
tort.46
In this era, one's entitlement to compensation was determined by
conventional morality or customary norms of behavior-the original
source of the common law. Due to the changed social circumstances
largely wrought by the industrial revolution, conventional morality
and customary norms no longer provided adequate guidance for the
45. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
46. David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76
B.U. L. REV. 59, 59-60 (1996).
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liability inquiry.47 In responding to these changed circumstances,
courts did not have to forego the historical concern for compensation.
Instead, the altered circumstances quite plausibly forced courts to de-
termine the substantive content of liability rules by relying on an ab-
stract tort norm of compensation-one that justifies tort
compensation by abstracting away from conventional morality and
customary norms of behavior.
Such a compensatory norm is clearly reflected in the scholarship of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the intellectual architect of modern tort law.
According to Holmes, "[T]he general purpose of the law of torts is to
secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, repu-
tation, or estate, at the hands of his neighbors, not because they are
wrong, but because they are harms." 4 8 A purpose of indemnifying
one for harms is nothing other than a compensatory rationale for tort
liability that is not defined by violations of conventional morality.
To be sure, tort law does not provide compensation for all harms
suffered by accident victims, but the question remains whether tort
law can be plausibly understood in terms of an abstract compensatory
norm. Any evaluation of a compensatory tort norm must begin with a
more complete statement of a compensatory tort right and its implica-
tions for tort liability. Under at least one such formulation, a compen-
satory tort right can explain why tort law has adopted a default rule of
negligence liability, yielding a conception of tort law that can be ade-
quately described by compensation-deterrence theory.49
A. Interest Analysis in a Rights-Based Tort System
Insofar as compensation-deterrence theory can be ascribed to main-
stream tort scholarship of the twentieth century, it must conform to
the mode of analysis commonly employed by scholars of that era.
"[T]he mainstream of mid-twentieth-century legal thought" conceived
"of tort law as a process in social engineering in which competing in-
terests were weighed."50
47. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Reform, 60
DEPAUL L. REv. 539, 545-47 (2011) (explaining why the rise of mass markets required tort law
to reject customary safety practices in favor of an abstract tort norm).
48. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 115 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963).
49. For more extended development of a compensatory tort right, including extensive discus-
sion of why such a right can explain the important doctrines and practices of tort law, see MARK
A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALs 81-377 (2008). The discussion in the ensuing two
subsections is largely drawn from id. at 81-107.
50. WHITE, supra note 2, at 158.
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To evaluate tort liability in terms of interest balancing, one need not
reject the traditional framework of tort law that bases liability on the
defendant's breach of a duty in violation of the plaintiff's tort right. A
tort inquiry that seeks to mediate or balance conflicting individual in-
terests can be completely consistent with a rights-based conception of
tort law that fully embraces the bilateral structure of tort liability.5'
To be protected by a right, an individual must have some interest
that is legally protected from being harmed by others seeking to fur-
ther their own interests or those of society.5 2 This formulation of the
tort right occurs at the outset of the multivolume Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts:
If society recognizes a desire as so far legitimate as to make one
who interferes with its realization civilly liable, the interest is given
legal protection, generally against all the world, so that everyone is
under a duty not to invade the interest by interfering with the reali-
zation of the desire by certain forms of conduct. Thus the interest in
bodily security is protected against not only intentional invasion but
against negligent invasion or invasion by the mischances inseparable
from an abnormally dangerous activity.53
An individual interest that "is protected against any form of inva-
sion ... becomes the subject matter of a 'right." 5 4 The specification
of such a right necessarily prioritizes the protected interest of the
rightholder over the conflicting interest of the dutyholder, making it
possible for the tort rule to burden the subordinate interest of the
dutyholder in order to protect the prioritized interest of the
rightholder. A rule that protects the individual interest in physical
security, for example, gives the security interest of the rightholder
some sort of legal priority over the conflicting or invading liberty in-
51. See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAw 6 (1999) (devel-
oping a private law conception of tort liability by reference to the principle that "[flair terms of
interaction must balance [any conflicts between individual interests in] liberty and security");
Gregory C. Keating, A Social Contract Conception of the Tort Law of Accidents, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 22 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (using a Rawlsian social-contracting
approach to explain how tort law mediates interpersonal conflicts of individual interests).
52. An individual right, more precisely, places limits or constraints on the reasons that can
justify governmental actions such as the enforcement of tort rules. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights
as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTs 153, 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (explaining why indi-
vidual rights are "trumps over some background justification for political decisions that states a
goal for the community as a whole"); see also Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin's Theory of
Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301 (2000) (explaining why Dworkin's formulation of rights as
"trumps" rules out justifications for infringing the right that are inconsistent with the substantive
rationale for the right).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. d (1965). The Restatement defines "interest"
as "the object of any human desire" and explains the relevance of these interests for tort law. Id.
§ 1.
54. Id. § 1 cmt. b.
396 [Vol. 61:383
2012] COMPENSATION-DETERRENCE THEORY
terest of the dutyholder. To do so, the tort rule must first distinguish
these interests in a manner that justifies a priority for the security in-
terest. The nature of the priority then defines the substantive content
of the tort right and correlative duty, making it possible to character-
ize rights-based tort rules in terms of an underlying priority that gives
one set of interests legal protection over another set of conflicting or
invading interests.
Consider a tort rule governing risky interactions between an auto-
mobile driver and a pedestrian. The transportation enables the driver
to pursue various liberty interests, including economic interests. As
an unwanted by-product of that activity, the driver exposes pedestri-
ans to a risk of bodily injury. A pedestrian is also acting in further-
ance of her liberty interests, including economic interests. In the
event of a crash that physically harms the pedestrian, by definition,
her interest in physical security has been injured, causing the pedes-
trian to suffer emotional harm (pain and suffering) and economic
harm (medical expenses). If the driver were obligated to pay compen-
satory damages for any of these harms, the monetary payment would
be detrimental to her economic interests. Any precautionary obliga-
tions that tort law imposes on the driver, such as a duty to drive
slowly, are detrimental to the associated liberty interests. Similarly,
any precautionary obligations that tort law imposes on the pedestrian,
such as a prohibition against jaywalking, restrict those liberty inter-
ests. The way in which tort law regulates the risky interaction will
burden or threaten at least one party's interests: either the pedes-
trian's interests in liberty and physical security; the driver's liberty in-
terests, including the economic interest; or the interests of both
parties. How these conflicting interests should be mediated is the ba-
sic question that must be addressed by tort law, and different resolu-
tions of the problem are provided by different specifications of the
tort right.
An absolute right to physical security, for example, would prohibit
the driver from threatening the pedestrian's security in any way. The
pedestrian's interest in physical security would have absolute priority
over the driver's conflicting liberty interest, justifying the negation of
the conflicting-and absolutely subordinate-liberty interest by a tort
rule that prohibits driving whenever the activity would threaten bodily
injury to a pedestrian, even if the risk were miniscule.
For reasons suggested by this rule, tort law does not give the
rightholder's security interest an absolute priority over the conflicting
liberty interests of another. As Holmes showed, the early common
law did not give the individual "an absolute right to his person, and so
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forth, [to be] free from detriment at the hands of his neighbors."55 An
absolute right would require the wholesale elimination of nonconsen-
sual risks, effectively preventing individuals from exercising their lib-
erty whenever the conduct might pose any risk, however slight, of
causing physical harm to another. An absolute right to physical secur-
ity would largely block social interactions, an outcome that is contrary
to the reason for prioritizing the security interest in the first instance.
Tort law protects the individual's interest in physical security for the
basic reason that an individual must be adequately secure in order to
live a meaningful life. As a matter of equality, this concern for indi-
vidual autonomy must apply to both the rightholder and correlative
dutyholder, which in turn explains why tort law has not adopted an
absolute right to physical security.
To be autonomous moral agents, individuals must have liberty, a
requirement vividly expressed by the New Hampshire state motto,
"Live free or die." Without liberty, physical security may not be
worth having. Liberty, however, depends on security. Unless our
bodies and personal possessions are adequately secure, the threat of
physical harm severely compromises our ability to make plans and live
a life of our choosing. The aftermath of September 11, 2001 provides
a sobering illustration. Autonomy requires both security and liberty.
For this reason, tort law cannot give an absolute priority to one of
these interests. The priority must instead be relative. The priority is
justified by a principle of equality that values individual autonomy or
self-determination, making the priority relative to that overarching,
general principle. This general principle holds that each person has an
equal right to freedom (or autonomy or self-determination) and then
gives different values to the individual interests in physical security
and liberty, depending on their relative importance for the exercise of
the general right. In this respect, a tort right of security can be rela-
tive to the right of liberty, explaining why courts have long recognized
that "[m]ost of the rights of property, as well as of person . . . are not
absolute but relative."5 6
This formulation of the tort right (and its correlative duty) explains
why the domain of tort law is limited to nonconsensual interactions.
The prima facie case for tort liability requires the absence of consent,
which distinguishes tortious behavior from socially acceptable behav-
55. See HOLMES, supra note 48, at 84-95 (1945) (explaining why this common description of
the tort right is mistaken).
56. Losee v. Buchanan, 6 N.Y. 476, 485 (1873).
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ior.5 7 "For example, consent turns a trespass into a dinner party; a
battery into a handshake; a theft into a gift."5 8 Fully consensual social
interactions are not regulated by tort law due to "the individualistic
tendency of the common law, which, proceeding from the people and
asserting their liberties, naturally regards the freedom of individual
action as the keystone of the whole structure." 59 To promote individ-
ual autonomy or self-determination, tort law needs to protect a
rightholder's interest in physical security only when she does not give
her fully informed, voluntary consent to the interaction.
Due to the pivotal importance of consent, the value of individual
autonomy or self-determination quite plausibly provides the metric by
which a tort rule balances or mediates conflicting interests of
rightholders and dutyholders, like drivers and pedestrians. Each of
the conflicting interests can be compared in terms of its importance
for the exercise of autonomy in the community, and the resultant rela-
tive valuation of the interests makes it possible for tort law to deter-
mine the extent to which the interests of the rightholder should be
protected or prioritized over the conflicting interests of the
dutyholder.
As Prosser explained, "This process of 'balancing the interests' is by
no means peculiar to the law of torts, but it has been carried to its
greatest lengths and has received its most general conscious recogni-
tion in this field."60 By conceptualizing tort law in terms of the inter-
est analysis favored by compensation-deterrence theorists, one can
fully embrace a rights-based conception of tort liability that operates
within the traditional bilateral framework of tort law.
57. Modem tort law originated with the writ of trespass, and allegations of wrongdoing under
that writ "were thought to be inappropriate where the defendant had acted with the consent of
the plaintiff." D. J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 42
(1999). Modem tort law continues to limit liability to nonconsensual interactions. See W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 112 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining
why consent "goes to negative the existence of any tort in the first instance"); see also DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 218 (2000) ("In many cases, consent is not a true affirmative defense
[to an intentional tort] but instead marks a deficiency in the plaintiffs prima facie case.");
DOBBS, supra, at 540-41 (explaining why the prima facie case for negligence liability depends on
the absence of consent).
58. Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 123 (1996).
59. Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (pt. 1), 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 14 (1907)
(discussing the common law maxim "volenti non fit injuria," or to one who consents no wrong is
done).
60. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 17.
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B. An Abstract Norm of Compensation
The discussion so far has developed an abstract formulation of tort
law, one that shows how any rights-based tort rule can be character-
ized by the manner in which it mediates conflicting individual interests
in relation to an underlying value of individual autonomy or self-
determination. Doing so is necessary in order to determine whether
such an abstract norm can explain why tort law does not limit liability
for compensatory damages to cases in which the defendant violated
conventional morality or departed from customary social practices,
the type of norm posited by compensation-deterrence theory.61
Although the compensatory norm is abstract in this sense, it never-
theless is firmly grounded in social conditions. In a rights-based tort
system that strives to give everyone an equal opportunity to exercise
autonomy or self-determination, tort disputes often involve cultural
and moral matters. To use the familiar terms of the Declaration of
Independence, such a rights-based tort system gives everyone an
equal right to "the Pursuit of Happiness" (autonomy or self-determi-
nation), which in turn supplies the value for determining how one in-
dividual's "right to life" must be mediated against another's "right to
liberty." Both are necessary for the purpose of self-determination,
but each does not have to be equally important in this respect. The
appropriate relation of these two rights will always be contestable in
light of the changing facts of social life, the importance of particular
types of risky conduct for purposes of self-determination within differ-
ent communities, and the consequences of injury for leading a life of
one's own choosing.
In the early stages of economic development, for example, a society
must expend most of its wealth to satisfy basic needs like hunger and
shelter. One individual's interest in physical security is hard to distin-
guish from another's liberty or economic interests directed toward
maintenance of the basic conditions required for a healthy existence.
In these social circumstances, the value of autonomy does not justify a
relative priority of the rightholder's security interest over the (norma-
tively indistinguishable) economic or liberty interest of the
dutyholder.
Without any normative distinction between the conflicting interests
of the two parties involved in the suit, tort law has no basis for shifting
the loss from one party (the defendant) to another (the plaintiff). The
loss must lie where it fell, on the injured plaintiff. The imposition of
liability instead requires a normative distinction between the interests
61. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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of the two parties, such as a finding of negligence (an unreasonable
liberty interest) that enables tort law to shift the loss to the defendant-
dutyholder (thereby burdening his subordinate liberty interest) in or-
der to compensate the plaintiff-rightholder (thereby protecting his pri-
oritized security interest). Interest analysis can readily explain why
the early common law would base liability on violations of conven-
tional morality or departures from customary forms of behavior, each
of which involves the dutyholder's unreasonable exercise of liberty
that is normatively distinguishable from, and legally subordinate to,
the legally protected security interest of the rightholder. The logic of
liability, however, is tied to social conditions and not conventional
morality.
Indeed, in the early stages of economic development, a rights-based
tort system would often limit duties in order to immunize risky behav-
ior from negligence liability. For some forms of behavior, the duty to
exercise reasonable care can entail a great enough restriction on the
exercise of liberty so that, on balance, individual autonomy would be
promoted within the community by permitting the risky conduct to
occur despite the ensuing threat to physical security.62 These condi-
tions will most frequently occur when the risky conduct is important
to economic development in a community that must devote the bulk
of its resources to the maintenance of the general conditions needed
to sustain a healthy existence. Once again, interest analysis can ex-
plain an important feature of the early common law; in this instance,
why the characteristic rule of tort law prior to the twentieth century
was neither negligence liability nor strict liability, but instead a rule of
no liability.63
As the twentieth century progressed, social wealth accumulated and
individuals were increasingly able to expend their economic resources
in a discretionary manner. The exercise of liberty was no longer
tethered to the maintenance of conditions necessary to sustain life.
Under these conditions, tort law can prioritize the individual interest
in physical security over the conflicting liberty interest of another
based on the judgment that our bodies and tangible possessions must
62. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Social Value as a Policy-Based Limitation of the Ordinary
Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 899 (2009) (discussing how courts
have limited negligence liability based on the concern that the duty to exercise reasonable care
would unduly restrict the exercise of individual autonomy for the category of cases in question).
63. See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 959-61 (1981).
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be adequately secure before we can meaningfully exercise our liberty
in the pursuit of happiness.64
Based on this balancing of the interests, tort rules can be formu-
lated "to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms"-the
first purpose of liability according to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.65 If a dutyholder's exercise of liberty foreseeably causes physi-
cal harm to a rightholder, a compensatory obligation burdens the
dutyholder's subordinate liberty interest to compensate harms it
caused to the prioritized security interest of the rightholder. This duty
permits the dutyholder to engage in risky behavior by relying on com-
pensation to protect the rightholder's security interest, the type of out-
come required by a right to physical security that is relative to a right
of liberty. Changed social circumstances accordingly explain why the
interest balancing employed by a rights-based tort system would pro-
duce a mid-twentieth-century "consensus" conception of tort law as a
"compensation system." 66
This compensatory norm is abstract in the sense that it provides a
basis for modern tort law to subject a defendant to liability for con-
duct that does not deserve to be admonished for having violated con-
ventional morality. A compensatory norm does not require
culpability or personal fault; the dutyholder's exercise of autonomy
instead establishes the requisite form of responsibility. The occur-
rence of foreseeable injury, not any moral shortcoming in the behav-
ior itself, can then trigger the obligation to pay compensatory
damages.
The normative power of this conception . . . resides in the idea
that the exercise of a person's positive agency, under circumstances
in which a harmful outcome could have been foreseen and avoided,
leads us to regard her as the author of the outcome. Others can
appropriately say of her, and she can say of herself, that she did it,
and this is true even if other factors (some of which might be the
acts of other persons) also causally contributed to the harm. The
agent acted and caused harm under circumstances in which she had
a sufficient degree of control to avoid its occurrence, and for that
reason she has a special responsibility for the outcome that other
persons do not have. That we view outcome-responsibility as rea-
son-affecting in this way is part of our deepest self-understanding of
64. Cf Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS.
143, 170-94 (2002) (showing that the leading justice theorists maintain that rights-based tort
rules prioritize the individual interest in physical security over the conflicting liberty and eco-
nomic interests of others).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (1979).
66. See WHITE, supra note 2.
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what it means to be a moral agent capable of both acting in the
world and acknowledging responsibility for what one has done.67
This form of responsibility is clearly reflected in the common law
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non kedas, which for present purposes
loosely translates into the principle of using your own so as not to
injure another.68 The maxim locates the compensatory duty in the in-
jury-causing conduct rather than the unreasonableness of the injurer's
behavior, and so it has frequently been invoked by courts and com-
mentators to justify rules of strict liability.69
This form of responsibility is also recognized by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, which justifies strict liability in terms of a
position [that] resonates deeply in public attitudes; if the person in
the street is asked whether a party should be liable for injuries that
the party causes, the person's answer is likely to be affirmative.
These perceptions and attitudes can be easily explained; when a
person voluntarily acts and in doing so secures the desired benefits
of that action, the person should in fairness bear responsibility for
the harms the action causes.70
The principle of outcome-responsibility-that a defendant can be
legally responsible for having foreseeably caused physical harm to an-
other regardless of personal fault or blameworthiness-has also been
recognized by other legal systems. For example, "this idea is an old,
fundamental element of European private law."71
67. Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 51, at 72, 92-93 (footnote omitted); see also TONY HONORE,
RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 14-40 (1999) (developing the concept of outcome-responsibility as
a justification for strict liability).
68. The maxim means "[u]se your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of
another." BLACK'S LAw DICrlONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979). As applied to risky behavior not
involving the use of property, the maxim yields a common law principle that "under the common
law a man acts at his peril." HOLMES, supra note 48, at 82 (stating that "some of the greatest
common law authorities" held this view).
69. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1254-56 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the sic
utere maxim is the basis for the rule of strict liability governing ultrahazardous activities under
Louisiana law); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Russell, 33 A. 709, 711 (Pa. 1896) ("'Sic
utere tuo non alienum ldas' expresses a moral obligation that grows out of the mere fact of
membership of civil society. In many instances it has been applied as a measure of civil obliga-
tion, enforceable at law among those whose interests are conflicting.").
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 cmt. f
(2010); see also Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 118
(1923) ("The concept universal among all primitive men, that an injury should be paid for by him
who causes it, irrespective of the moral or social quality of his conduct . . . still dominates the
opinion of the sort of men who form the average jury.").
71. Nils Jansen, Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on
the European Law of Extracontractual Liability, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 443, 443 (2004)
(arguing that liability based on outcome-responsibility, as opposed to blameworthiness, "is con-
stitutive for the modern European law of extracontractual liability").
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An abstract norm of compensation, therefore, can readily justify
rules of strict liability, but can it also explain why the tort system relies
on a default rule of negligence liability to govern cases of accidental
harm? The same problem is faced by compensation-deterrence the-
ory: Why do the functions of compensation and deterrence not justify
a general rule of strict liability instead of negligence liability? 72 Inter-
est analysis shows how tort liability can be derived from an abstract
norm of compensation, but does this norm value deterrence in a man-
ner that justifies negligence liability as the default rule for accidental
harms?
C. The Value of Deterrence Within a Compensatory Tort System
A compensatory tort norm is easily conflated with the compensa-
tory damage remedy, making it seem self-evident that such a norm
does not value deterrence or otherwise justify the limited availability
of the compensatory damage remedy-two fundamental attributes of
negligence liability. Consequently, the proposition that tort law serves
the function of compensation has been summarily dismissed by schol-
ars on the ground that the "tort system does not . .. purport to redress
all material losses, physical or mental."73 As one leading scholar put
it, "[I]f by the term 'function' we mean a 'goal' of tort law, the notion
that providing compensation is a function of tort law is debatable at
best." 74 This critique assumes that tort law can accomplish the func-
tion of compensation only through an award of compensatory dam-
ages, but that assumption is not warranted when liability is justified by
an abstract norm of compensation.
An abstract norm of compensation would exclusively rely on the
compensatory damage remedy only if the harm suffered by the legally
protected interest of the plaintiff could be fully compensated by that
remedy. The injuries of primary concern to tort law-bodily injury
and damage to real or tangible property-are not fully reparable in
this respect. Most obviously, simply compensating someone with
monetary damages for a nonconsensual physical harm can be prob-
lematic (consider rape). Before it can defensibly employ the compen-
satory damage remedy, a compensatory norm must first address any
normative problems created by the rightholder's lack of consent and
the poor manner in which compensatory damages otherwise protect
72. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (identifying the limited role of strict liability
as one of the central puzzles posed by compensation-deterrence theory).
73. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedies, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
772, 775 (1985).
74. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAw 18 (3d ed. 2007).
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the tort right. A compensatory tort norm is not the same as the com-
pensatory damage remedy.
For these reasons, a compensatory tort norm does not justify a rule
of strict liability as the sole means for protecting the tort right. When
a dutyholder is subject only to a rule of strict liability, she faces a
single legal obligation to pay compensatory damages to a rightholder
for the injuries governed by the duty.75 An exclusive duty to pay com-
pensatory damages is obviously problematic for nonconsensual harms
that cannot be adequately redressed with this remedy. Due to this
inherent limitation of the compensatory damage remedy, an abstract
norm of tort compensation justifies negligence as the default rule of
liability.76
Whereas strict liability exclusively relies on the compensatory dam-
age remedy, negligence is a behavioral rule that primarily obligates
dutyholders to exercise reasonable care, an obligation that cannot be
fully satisfied by the dutyholder's willingness to pay compensatory
damages to the rightholder in exchange for a nonconsensual violation
of the tort right.77 The duty of reasonable care includes the obligation
to behave by reference to "the value which the law attaches to the
conduct," which need not equal the actor's subjective valuation.78 For
example, a driver who speeds for the thrill of scaring pedestrians does
not promote an objectively recognized tort value. Without the pedest-
rians' consent, the conduct completely disvalues their protected inter-
ests in physical security and is not legitimized by the driver's payment
of compensatory damages for any injuries caused by this conduct.
75. To be sure, a strictly liable defendant can act in a manner that merits punitive damages.
See Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992) (upholding punitive damage awards for
products liability claims based solely on strict liability). However, the punitive award is not
merited by the mere fact that the conduct subject to strict liability (such as the sale of a defective
product) proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. See id. at 653-56 (following the majority rule
by requiring proof of "actual malice" to justify an award of punitive damages in a product case).
The additional proof required to support a claim for punitive damages, such as actual malice or
deliberate indifference, would necessarily establish ordinary negligence liability in addition to
strict liability. Cf Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1983) ("Most cases under state common
law, although varying in their precise terminology, have adopted more or less the same rule,
recognizing that punitive damages in tort cases may be awarded not only for actual intent to
injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness, serious indifference to or disregard for the rights
of others, or even gross negligence."). The resultant rule is not a pure form of strict liability, and
so in this respect strict liability entails no legal obligation beyond the duty to pay compensatory
damages.
76. Much of the ensuing discussion in support of this conclusion is drawn from Mark A.
Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability, 121
YALE L.J. 142, 159-68, 183-89 (2011).
77. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law and the Inherent Limitations of Monetary Exchange:
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and the Negligence Rule, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTs § 283 cmt. e (1965).
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Otherwise, dutyholders would be able to violate the tort rights of
others, including the right to be protected from physical attack,
merely by paying the "price" of compensatory damages, contrary to
the autonomy rationale for the individual right.79 Lacking any objec-
tive value, the conduct can be prohibited by tort law (and punished by
the penalty of punitive damages).80 The objectively defined negli-
gence rule, therefore, enables tort law to formulate the duty to ensure
that the absence of the rightholder's consent is not contrary to the
underlying value of individual autonomy or self-determination pro-
tected by the tort right.
Aside from the difficulties posed by the absence of consent, courts
have recognized that the compensatory damage remedy does not ade-
quately protect the tort right for another obvious reason. The most
severe physical harm governed by tort law is wrongful death, and yet
monetary damages cannot compensate a dead rightholder for the pre-
mature loss of life. Compensatory damages also do not make the
plaintiff-rightholder "whole" in cases of bodily harm, nor does this
remedy strive to do so. 81 As the California and Wisconsin Supreme
Courts observed almost a century ago, "No rational being would
change places with the injured man for an amount of gold that would
fill the room of the court, yet no lawyer would contend that such is the
legal measure of damages."8 2 The monetary award undoubtedly ben-
efits the plaintiff, but courts have recognized that the efficacy of the
compensatory damage remedy is inherently limited by the poor man-
ner in which money can substitute for the plaintiff's lost bodily
integrity.
To address these obvious problems with the compensatory damage
remedy, courts have adopted various rules. Since at least the seven-
teenth century, the common law has defined an injury as being "irrep-
79. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE
L.J. 1335, 1338-39 (1986) ("It is surely odd to claim that an individual's right is protected when
another individual is permitted to force a transfer at a price set by third parties. Isn't the very
idea of a forced transfer contrary to the autonomy or liberty thought constitutive of rights?").
80. See Geistfeld, supra note 76, at 165-69 (identifying the types of behavior prohibited by the
negligence rule and explaining why a defendant who engaged in such behavior cannot avoid
liability for punitive damages even if she is fully willing and able to pay compensatory damages
for the injuries in question).
81. The difficulty involves the problem of compensating the badly injured plaintiff for the loss
of life's pleasures. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979) (stating that a
damage award for the loss of life's pleasures is not supposed to "restore the injured person to his
previous position" but should instead only "give to the injured person some pecuniary return for
what he has suffered or is likely to suffer").
82. Zibbell v. S. Pac. Co., 116 P. 513, 520 (Cal. 1911) (quoting Heddles v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co.,
42 N.W. 237, 243 (Wis. 1889)).
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arable" if it "cannot be adequately measured or compensated by
money."83 Premature death and bodily injury are paradigmatic exam-
ples of irreparable injuries, although the judicial conception of irrepa-
rable injury extends to damage inflicted on a rightholder's real or
tangible property.84 In cases of irreparable injury, "judges have been
brought to see and to acknowledge . . . that a remedy which prevents a
threatened wrong is in its essential nature better than a remedy which
permits the wrong to be done, and then attempts to pay for it."85
In seeking to prevent irreparable injuries, the common law has also
long recognized the principle that the tort obligation cannot impose
undue hardship on the dutyholder.86 The issue of undue hardship is
addressed by the abstract norm of compensation.
A dutyholder's compensatory obligation can be defined by the bur-
den that she would incur under ideal compensatory conditions in
which there are no irreparable injuries.87 This compensatory obliga-
tion, in turn, can determine the amount of care required by the negli-
gence rule. Instead of requiring the dutyholder to expend the
compensatory resources on the damages remedy, the tort rule can
relocate that compensatory obligation to the exercise of reasonable
care. These safety expenditures reduce risk, or the likelihood that the
rightholder will suffer irreparable injury. Dollar for dollar, the pre-
vention of premature death and other irreparable injuries provides
better protection for the rightholder's interest in physical security than
does an award of monetary damages. The resultant duty to exercise
reasonable care accordingly seeks to prevent the irreparable injury of
physical harm without imposing undue hardship on the dutyholder,
83. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009).
84. See Geistfeld, supra note 76, at 164 (discussing the rule of irreparable injury and explain-
ing why it ordinarily encompasses damages to real or tangible property).
85. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EourrY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 389 (1883). In discussing this quotation, Professor Douglas
Laycock has observed:
Pomeroy's statement ... is not quite right ... . But it captures an important insight
.... Remedies that prevent harm altogether are better for plaintiffs, and plaintiffs
should have such remedies if they want them and if there is no good reason to deny
them. A general preference for damages is not a reason unless there is a reason for the
preference. Judges act on these premises, whether or not they consciously acknowl-
edge all that Pomeroy imputed to them.
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 688, 689 (1990)
(footnote omitted).
86. Cf Laycock, supra note 85, at 732-39 (discussing the rule that monetary damages provide
the remedy for harms that would otherwise be irreparable when equitable relief would interfere
with countervailing rights or impose undue hardship on the dutyholder).
87. For more rigorous discussion of the argument in this paragraph, see Mark Geistfeld, Rec-
onciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 114 (2001).
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the same approach the common law takes with respect to other types
of irreparable injuries.
For example, an automobile driver cannot ordinarily pay compensa-
tion to a pedestrian prior to their risky interaction, and, in the event
that the pedestrian is killed in an accident, the driver cannot provide
ex post compensation with the damage remedy. In order to give the
pedestrian rightholder the compensation to which she is entitled, tort
law requires the dutyholder to exercise reasonable care. The duty of
reasonable care specifies required forms of precautionary behavior
that would prevent the rightholder from suffering injury in the first
instance. As explained above, this precautionary burden can be speci-
fied in a manner that equals the total burden that the dutyholder
would otherwise incur under ideal conditions of full compensation.
Thus, under the negligence rule, the dutyholder can satisfy the com-
pensatory obligation by incurring these expenses through the exercise
of reasonable care that directly protects the rightholder's interest in
physical security. The standard of reasonable care, therefore, can be
derived from a compensatory obligation while also comporting with
the common meaning of compensation as "something that
counterbalances or makes up for an undesirable or unwelcome state
of affairs."""
A compensatory formulation of the tort right accordingly resolves
one of the central puzzles posed by compensation-deterrence theory,
which is to explain why these two functions do not justify a default
rule of strict liability. In a compensatory tort system, the functions of
compensation and deterrence are each vitally important in a manner
that justifies objective negligence liability as the default rule for acci-
dental harms.
Because the compensatory tort right values the functions of com-
pensation and deterrence, it also explains why tort law can be usefully
analyzed with compensation-deterrence theory. The substantive con-
tent of a compensatory tort right is based on the type of interest
balancing that is employed by compensation-deterrence theory. Con-
sequently, the logic of a compensatory tort right can be readily ex-
pressed in terms of compensation-deterrence theory, explaining why
mainstream tort scholarship in the twentieth century can be described
either in terms of compensation-deterrence theory or a consensus po-
sition based on a compensatory conception of tort liability.89 Despite
88. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DicrIONARY 349 (2001).
89. Compare Goldberg, supra note 1, at 521 ("[A] great deal-perhaps the majority-of twen-
tieth-century torts scholarship has consisted of 'normal science' undertaken within the paradigm
of compensation-deterrence theory."), with WHTE, supra note 2, at 146-47, 178 (describing the
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the apparent differences between these two conceptions of tort liabil-
ity, each can be derived from an abstract tort norm of compensation.
IV. COMPENSATION-DETERRENCE THEORY IN CONTEXT
Many, if not most, of the tort scholars who might be placed in the
compensation-deterrence camp will be puzzled by a formulation of
compensation-deterrence theory based on a compensatory tort right.
During the twentieth century-the purported heyday of this scholarly
approach-the rationale for tort liability often involved considera-
tions of public law, alternative compensation systems, and liability in-
surance, none of which seems to be relevant to a conception of private
tort law grounded in an individual right. Once the tort right is placed
in context, however, it becomes easy to see why a compensatory norm
straightforwardly leads to discussions of public law and alternative
compensation systems.
A. Private Law? Public Law?
As John Goldberg has shown, compensation-deterrence theory en-
visions tort law in a manner that "had transformed itself from private
to 'public' law, whereby it functioned to achieve collective, not correc-
tive, justice." 90 If compensation-deterrence theory conceptualizes tort
law in terms of collective justice, how could it be compatible with a
formulation of tort liability based on a compensatory tort right that
implements corrective justice?
In a compensatory tort system, the appropriate formulation of lia-
bility rules critically depends on context. Different types of risky in-
teractions create different types of compensatory problems. Solving
the different types of compensatory problems shows why the tradi-
tional tort concern for corrective justice is now often no different from
the concern for collective justice.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed, "Our law of torts
comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults,
slanders, and the like, where the damages might be taken to lie where
they fell by legal judgment." 91 Holmes then observed that "the torts
with which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of
certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or prop-
central debate as whether tort law is best understood as furthering the objective of compensation
or deterrence, and concluding that the issue was resolved in the 1970s in favor of a "consensus"
conception of tort law as a "compensation system").
90. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 524.
91. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
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erty by railroads, factories, and the like." 92 As the economy expanded
throughout the twentieth century, individuals became increasingly sit-
uated in a mass market of some sort. The increased interdependence
among individuals in modern society has also created other forms of
interrelationships among individual tort rights. Today, the nature of a
rights violation is often quite different from the isolated, ungeneral-
ized wrongs that were redressed by the early common law. Tort liabil-
ity now routinely involves the redress of an individual right that is
interrelated with the rights of other individuals, creating categorical
effects that explain why tort liability can be fruitfully analyzed in the
collective terms of public law.
Consider the problem of automobile accidents. As an objective
matter, tort rules governing automobile accidents apply to reciprocally
situated parties, which means that each individual driver is simultane-
ously a rightholder and dutyholder in equal respects vis-A-vis all other
individual drivers. 93 When each person is simultaneously a
rightholder and dutyholder in equal respects, any normative distinc-
tion between the individual as rightholder and the individual as
dutyholder effectively collapses, yielding a unitary conception of the
individual driver whose full set of interests must be adequately pro-
tected by tort law.94 The concern for corrective justice between the
individual rightholder and correlative dutyholder, therefore, is no dif-
ferent than the concern for collective justice or the way in which tort
liability must serve the collective good of all drivers.
The same conclusion applies to individual rightholders in mass mar-
kets for reasons most easily illustrated by products liability. Individ-
ual consumers have different preferences for product safety and other
aspects of quality, making it ordinarily infeasible for product sellers in
a mass market to completely satisfy the preferences of everyone.
Product sellers in mass markets respond to aggregate consumer de-
mand, and so products liability rules are formulated by reference to
the safety expectations of the ordinary or average consumer, not the
particular plaintiff.95 What is fair or just for the individual consumer
is no different from what is collectively best for all consumers in the
92. Id.
93. See GEISTFELD, supra note 49, at 93-95 (explaining why reciprocity in the individual case
depends on an objective inquiry concerning the nature of the risky activity that does not depend
on the actual traits of the plaintiff and defendant).
94. See id. at 197-98.
95. See, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233 n.6 (Cal. 1982) (concluding
that, under the consumer-expectations test, "the jury considers the expectations of a hypotheti-
cal reasonable consumer, rather than those of the particular plaintiff in the case").
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market. Corrective justice, once again, overlaps with collective
justice.
Any evaluation of tort law that misses the collective nature of these
liability rules will ignore critical features of the tort landscape for rea-
sons that can again be most easily illustrated by products liability. Be-
cause a manufacturer's safety decision depends on the safety needs of
the average or ordinary consumer, the individual tort right of each
consumer in the market is necessarily interrelated. Any particular
rights violation can have categorical effects for similarly situated
rightholders. A single claim seeking recovery for injuries caused by a
defectively designed product, for example, implicates all other identi-
cally designed products in the market. One claim can also influence
the litigation decisions of similarly situated consumers, further influ-
encing the manufacturer's safety decisions with respect to the entire
market.96 Litigation of the individual tort case does not involve an
isolated instance of wrongdoing that was characteristic of the claims
adjudicated by the early common law, but can now affect other
rightholders (consumers) in the mass market, creating categorical ef-
fects that are not present in the traditional tort context. These effects
are made obvious by a characterization of products liability as a form
of collective liability or public law, whereas any evaluation of these
claims that views them as mere instances of individual wrongs will
miss this critical aspect of products liability cases.
"Early and mid-twentieth-century tort scholars ... argued that in an
interdependent society the costs of injuries were everyone's responsi-
bility. The public law dimensions of tort law grew from this percep-
tion of social interdependence." 97 In an increasingly interdependent
society, the traditional tort concern for corrective justice becomes in-
creasingly indistinguishable from a concern for collective justice. By
focusing on the latter concern, one can analyze aspects of tort liability
that might not otherwise be apparent.98 A concern for collective jus-
96. Mass torts routinely involve defective products. The litigation dynamic for a mass tort
involves a movement from the "immature" to "mature" stages. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS
TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 219-49 (2007).
The transition to the mature litigation stage comes only when the threat to prevail is
such that defendants face a substantial probability of loss in the event of trial. The
usual way to establish the credibility of this threat, not surprisingly, is through actual
plaintiff victories in some early cases.
Id. at 15.
97. WHITE, supra note 2, at 219.
98. Cf Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Deterrence Rationale for Punitive Damages, in
THE POWER OF PUNITIVE DAMAGEs-Is EUROPE MISSING OUT? 107 (R.C. Meurkens & E.
Nordin eds., 2012) (showing that punitive damages limited to the vindication of the plaintiffs
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tice, however, can be squared with a rights-based conception of tort
liability.
Indeed, the ascription of a social purpose to the tort inquiry does
not necessarily make tort law a form of public law for reasons identi-
fied by Robert Rabin:
A "tort system" exists only because at some point a sovereign devel-
oped the notion that for communal reasons it made sense to provide
a mechanism for redress of individual grievances resulting from per-
sonal harm through "courts." . . . A system of private law does not
fall from the sky or emerge mystically from a collective will.
Whether it is a response to utilitarian concerns or claims of natural
right, it cannot but reflect an independent choice of external
purpose.99
Compensation-deterrence theory can be socially purposive or in-
volve an exercise in social engineering without rejecting the premise
that tort law is based on individual tort rights and their correlative
duties.
B. Liability Insurance and Alternative Compensation Systems
In describing the mid-twentieth-century "consensus" conception of
tort liability as a "compensation system,"100 G. Edward White dis-
cusses the various ways in which tort scholarship of this era was influ-
enced by considerations of liability insurance and alternative
compensation systems. "Liability insurance had come to be conceived
of as the principle mechanism for distributing losses in tort law."101
Having concluded that "tort law had become primarily a compensa-
tion system designed to distribute the costs of injuries throughout so-
ciety efficiently and fairly," 102 tort scholars understandably considered
institutional alternatives. By the 1970s, White observed that "[t]he
novel quality of recent [tort] casebooks [was] their tendency to specu-
late broadly on the functions of tort law as a whole, especially when
evaluated against alternative compensation systems, such as no-fault
insurance schemes."1 03 These developments can all be explained by a
compensatory conception of tort liability.
individual tort right as required by the constitutional requirement of due process fully further
the social interest in general deterrence in mass markets).
99. Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law's Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2270 (1996) (reviewing
wEINRIB, supra note 10).
100. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 146-47, 178.
101. Id. at 148.
102. Id. at 150.
103. Id. at 215.
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Regardless of the categorical or social effects of liability, context
also matters in tort law because it determines the nature of the rela-
tionship between the rightholder and dutyholder. Outside of acciden-
tal injuries in mass markets, the most pervasive form of tort liability
for much of the twentieth century involved automobile accidents.1o4
For compensatory purposes, tortious conduct in a market relationship
is fundamentally similar to tortious conduct on the highway. That
similarity, in turn, explains why compensation-deterrence theory is so
attentive to concerns about liability insurance and alternative com-
pensation systems.
In cases involving automobile accidents or accidental harms in mar-
ket settings, the rightholder (driver or consumer) effectively pays for
the burdens of the duty (as a reciprocally situated driver or consumer
paying higher prices).105 To adequately protect the rightholder's full
set of interests in these contexts, torf law must minimize the cost of
injury compensation ultimately borne by the rightholder, a goal that
will necessarily consider the available forms of insurance and alterna-
tive institutions for compensating injuries.
As established by the substantial market for insurance that exists
today, individuals ordinarily are made better off by having insurance
for monetary losses such as medical expenses, lost wages, and prop-
erty damage.106 However, health insurance was not widely available
in the United States until the 1950s. 07 Not surprisingly, accidental
injuries were often financially ruinous for individuals in this era.' 08
For these reasons, many tort scholars in the first half of the twentieth
century maintained that tort compensation supplies a justifiable form
of insurance for accident victims.109 When courts adopted strict prod-
104. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault's "De-
mise," 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2012) (discussing the history of tort liability for automobile
accidents).
105. See GEISTFELD, supra note 49, at 197-99.
106. Under the common condition in which there is a decreasing individual marginal utility of
wealth (the analytic characteristic of risk aversion), actuarially fair insurance reduces the total
cost (measured in terms of reduced individual utility) of accidental monetary harms. See, e.g.,
HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIs 180-81 (3d ed. 1992).
107. See RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS: THE SEARCH FOR A HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE POLICY 23-24 (1986); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 327-28 (1982).
108. For a particularly influential study reaching this conclusion, see COMm. TO STUDY COMP.
FOR AUTO. ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1932).
109. See, e.g., MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY, AND
TORT REFORM (1995); see also George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 470-75
(1985) (discussing the scholarship of Fleming James and its influence on other scholars).
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ucts liability in the middle of the century, they often justified the lia-
bility rule with this insurance rationale. 110 The insurance rationale for
tort liability critically relies on the defendant's tort liability being cov-
ered by liability insurance, which in turn spreads the risk of accidental
injuries throughout society."' In a historical period of limited forms
of insurance, one could defensibly conclude that rightholders such as
consumers or automobile drivers would prefer to pay for tort compen-
sation for their accidental injuries because that compensation func-
tioned as a cost-effective means of insurance.
The insurance market has dramatically changed, however. Since
the mid-twentieth century, health insurance has become widely availa-
ble. 112 By the 1960s, a sizable portion of the population had health
insurance, such insurance was widely available, and government-
funded social insurance programs had substantially expanded. 113 To-
day the vast majority of accident victims receive some injury compen-
sation from their own insurance policies and government programs.114
An individual's insurance choice is no longer limited to "tort insur-
ance" as opposed to no insurance. It now involves a range of insur-
ance options. All else (such as the risk of injury) being equal, the
individual tort rights of consumers and automobile drivers are best
protected by legal rules that redirect injury compensation from the
tort system into alternative mechanisms that are less costly for these
rightholders. As compared to the tort compensation financed by lia-
bility insurance, compensation supplied by other insurance mecha-
nisms is much less costly."i5 Under these conditions, the insurance
rationale for tort liability is not tenable-the conclusion expressly
reached by courts in the area of products liability 1 6 and the motiva-
tion for no-fault insurance schemes governing automobile acci-
dents.117 The reorientation away from liability insurance to
110. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 32-33 (2006).
111. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (discussing liability insurance and its influence
on tort law throughout the twentieth century).
112. This market grew rapidly during World War II, when employers began offering health
insurance as an employee benefit not subject to wage controls, making it an important form of
employee remuneration in a tight labor market. See FEIN, supra note 107, at 21-22. The insur-
ance provided by employers also had tax advantages, further promoting its growth. See id. at 22.
113. See id. at 23, 52-67.
114. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 108 tbl.4.22 (1991) (summarizing a study that found about eighty-five percent of
all accident victims received some compensation from their own insurance and public programs).
115. See GEISTFELD, supra note 110, at 64-67.
116. Id. at 67 & nn.17-18.
117. See Engstrom, supra note 104, at 352-56.
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alternative compensation mechanisms does not somehow devalue the
underlying tort right, but instead is directly implied by it.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators regularly analyze tort law in terms of the
functions of compensation and deterrence. For example, the Supreme
Court of Hawai'i has recently explained that
[a]pproaching torts from a policy perspective is germane to
Hawai'i jurisprudence; as this court has written, "tort law is prima-
rily designed to vindicate social policy." One social policy enacted
through the tort system is compensating injured plaintiffs. . . . Sec-
ond, tort law seeks to prevent injury where possible by providing
incentive to deter negligent acts.118
In addition to underscoring the importance of compensation-deter-
rence reasoning, this passage also reveals its apparent shortcomings.
Why is the function of compensation only furthered in cases of negli-
gence? Why not compensate a larger number of injured plaintiffs
under a rule of strict liability? Is the function of compensation instead
somehow tied to the function of deterrence? If so, what determines
the relation between these two functions? What is the social policy
that courts rely on to answer these questions in a principled manner?
As these questions suggest, the functions of compensation and de-
terrence do not obviously cohere into a viable theory of tort law. This
problem has been seized by critics who argue that, despite the wide-
spread acceptance of compensation-deterrence reasoning, the ap-
proach is incoherent and unprincipled in application.
The functions of injury compensation and deterrence can be unified
by an abstract tort norm of compensation, one that does not limit lia-
bility to violations of conventional morality or customary practices in
the community. For historical and other reasons, compensation plau-
sibly provides the norm by which tort law defines the obligation run-
ning between dutyholders and rightholders. When risky interactions
threaten the irreparable injury of physical harm, the compensatory
damage remedy does not adequately protect the rightholder's interest
in physical security. Consequently, the compensatory tort norm redi-
rects the dutyholder's compensatory obligation from the payment of
compensatory damages to the exercise of reasonable care, yielding a
default rule of negligence liability that is formulated to deter the irrep-
arable injury of physical harm without imposing undue hardship on
the dutyholder. A compensatory tort norm justifies the manner in
118. Steigman v. Outrigger Enters., Inc., 267 P.3d 1238, 1246-47 (Haw. 2011) (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Francis v. Lee Enters., Inc., 971 P.2d 707, 712 (Haw. 1999)).
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which negligence liability furthers the function of deterrence, unifying
compensation and deterrence within a coherent rationale for tort
liability.
Regardless of whether the approach is described abstractly as a
compensatory norm or more concretely in terms of compensation-
deterrence reasoning, it poses one last puzzle. By valuing alternative
institutional mechanisms for compensating injuries and deterring un-
safe behavior, the approach could justify the elimination of tort liabil-
ity altogether. Why, then, would this type of reasoning be embraced
by scholars whose decision to specialize in the study of tort law pre-
sumably reflects a deep belief in its fundamental importance? The
point is forcefully made by John Goldberg, yet again, in his observa-
tion that "tort is a department of the law that has fewer serious cham-
pions than any comparable subdiscipline. . . . Tort law is unloved."119
The question might seem to be particularly puzzling when consid-
ered in relation to the honoree of this Symposium, Robert Rabin.
Without question, Rabin is deeply interested in the institutional alter-
natives to tort law, but it is equally without question that Rabin deeply
cares about tort law. Why else expend the considerable effort to pro-
duce so many editions of a casebook entitled Tort Law and Alterna-
tives?120 Is such an extended commitment both to tort law and its
alternatives somehow incoherent? I do not purport to give an answer
on Bob's behalf, but I do not see why there is any necessary tension
between tort law and its institutional alternatives.121
When one values both compensation and deterrence, tort law takes
on significance that is not limited to existing legal arrangements. Any
government concerned about protecting individuals from physical
harm will use tort law in combination with other institutions. The first
such institution was the criminal justice system. With the advent of
the modern administrative state, government has employed an array
of other regulatory institutions.122 Polluters are subject to a variety of
statutory and regulatory requirements enforced by the Environmental
Protection Agency; a different federal agency regulates workplace
safety; another one regulates prescription drugs and medical devices;
and other federal agencies regulate other matters of public health and
119. John C. P. Goldberg, Essay, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1501, 1502-03 (2002).
120. See MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES (9th ed. 2011).
121. The ensuing discussion is largely derived from the conclusion of GEISTELD, supra note
49, at 375-77.
122. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189 (1986).
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safety.123 The states also have regulatory agencies. The extent to
which the government protects individuals from harmful behavior
now largely depends on the combined effect of administrative regula-
tion, criminal law, and tort law.
Similarly, the compensatory significance of tort law depends on the
extent to which the government otherwise provides insurance for in-
jured citizens. Insofar as a disabled or injured individual receives
government-funded insurance for health care and lost wages, the com-
pensatory role for tort law is reduced.
Thus, one can imagine a society in which tort law is largely unneces-
sary. All risks could be regulated administratively, and all compensa-
ble harms could be covered by insurance. These institutions would
adequately protect the individual interest in physical security, elimi-
nating this role for tort law.
The unrealism of this scenario does not detract from the signifi-
cance of its implications. Unlike the United States, countries in the
European Union have less tort liability supplemented by more exten-
sive administrative regulation and government-provided insurance. 124
The reduced role of tort liability in these liberal democracies hardly
makes them less fair or less just than the United States, just like the
increased role of tort liability in the United States hardly implies that
Americans are litigation crazy. Tort law is but one institution of many
that protects individuals from physical harm, making the functional
importance of tort law contingent on the full range of complementary
institutions. 125
The contingency of the tort system does not reduce the importance
of tort law. Behavior that is wrongful as a matter of tort law can also
be wrongful in other contexts, making tort doctrines useful for these
related legal fields. The federal securities laws, for example, rely on
tort concepts of fraud and causation.126 The protection of individual
rights is also of primary concern for other important bodies of law,
including civil rights and human rights more generally. Tort law is one
123. See id. at 1279-95.
124. See JULIE A. DAVIES & PAUL T. HAYDEN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN TORT LAw 13 (2008).
125. Cf Dana A. Kerr et al., A Cross-National Study of Government Social Insurance as an
Alternative to Tort Liability Compensation, 76 J. RISK & INS. 367, 382 (2009) ("Using data from
24 countries over a 12-year period ... [to] find a strong negative relationship between the gov-
ernment social program spending and the size of liability costs as measured by insurance premi-
ums. . . . [This supports] the hypothesis that generous social programs have influenced the
development of litigation as a means to compensate injured parties.").
126. See, e.g., Louis Loss, Commentary, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105
HARV. L. REV. 908, 910-11 (1992) (explaining how courts have effectively "develop[ed] a new
federal tort" under the Securities Exchange Act).
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of the oldest legal institutions for protecting individual rights, deeply
influencing how we think about protecting rights in other contexts. 127
Is the individual right to physical security best protected by a
cost-benefit analysis of safety decisions? Does the right require
greater protection? These issues, which have long occupied the tort
system, are now critically important for determining how governments
should approach the problem of global warming, illustrating how tort
principles can guide momentous decisions outside of the tort sys-
tem.128 Tort law originated in a world far different from our own, but
the government still needs to adequately protect each individual from
physical harm, giving tort principles significance that extends far be-
yond the tort system. One need not love the tort system in order to
love tort law.
127. The major legal systems throughout history have recognized tort law, making widely
adopted tort rules a source of international law governing human rights. The International
Court of Justice, for example, is supposed to apply "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations." U.N. Charter art. 38, para. 1.c.
128. Those who want governments to take decisive actions to immediately reduce the threat
of global warming often invoke the precautionary principle, which maintains that "[w]here there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. AICONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June 13,
1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). The appropriate interpretation of the precaution-
ary principle has long been in dispute, with critics claiming that the principle cannot be justified
or implemented in a defensible manner. See Mark Geistfeld, Implementing the Precautionary
Principle, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,326, 11,326 (2001). When interpreted as a solution to the type of
the problem addressed by tort law, involving the fair protection of the individual right to physi-
cal security, the precautionary principle translates into a well-defined decision rule. See
Geistfeld, supra, at 11,377-33.
